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͞DaŶgerousŶess͟ iŶ UŶlawful act ŵaŶslaughter 
 
R v F & E [2015] EWCA Crim 351, Court of Appeal 
 
Keywords: Unlawful act manslaughter; Dangerousness; Aggravated Arson 
 
In June 2013, the appellants, JF (a boy aged 14½) and NE (a girl aged 16), set fire to an old 
duvet in the basement of a derelict building in Croydon, south London. The fire spread from 
the duǀet to a pile of old tǇƌes ǁhiĐh filled the ďaseŵeŶt ǁith ͞thiĐk, aĐƌid sŵoke͟ as they 
burned. A 35-year-old Polish man, Sylwester Mendzelewski, who was sleeping rough in the 
building at the time, was trapped in the basement and died from the effects of smoke 
inhalation. JF and NE were charged with manslaughter (count 1) and aggravated reckless 
arson, contrary to s 1(2), Criminal Damage Act 1971 (count 2). They appeared before HH 
Judge McKinnon and a jury at Croydon Crown Court in June 2014. Neither appellant gave 
evidence to the court but, in interview, JF said that he had known that people slept in the 
building but said that he had believed no-one to be there at the time. NE said that she had 
thought there was no-one in the building.  
 
The trial judge directed the jury on manslaughter based on an unlawful and dangerous act 
;͞unlawful act manslaughter͟Ϳ. He told them that, in order to convict the appellants, it had 
to be proved that the appellants had committed an unlawful act, namely arson. He then told 
them that the Crown had to prove two further elements in order to establish manslaughter: 
fiƌst, that ͞at the tiŵe of staƌtiŶg the fiƌe the defeŶdaŶt foƌesaǁ oƌ ĐoŶteŵplated the 
possiďilitǇ that soŵe peƌsoŶ oƌ peƌsoŶs, kŶoǁŶ oƌ uŶkŶoǁŶ, ŵight ďe iŶ the ďuildiŶg͟; 
second, that the unlawful act was dangerous ͞iŶ that all soďeƌ aŶd reasonable people would 
inevitably have recognised that such person or persons might sustain some physical harm 
hoǁeǀeƌ slight͟. The appellants were convicted of manslaughter but acquitted of 
aggravated reckless arson. However, they were convicted of reckless arson, contrary to s 
1(1), Criminal Damage Act 1971. On appeal, the appellants submitted that their acquittal of 
aggravated reckless arson showed that the jury found that they did not have the subjective 
appreciation of the risk of harm to any person. It was also contended that the objective test 
regarding dangerousness should have been adapted to take into account (i) the ability of 
persons of similar ages to them to foresee risks and (ii) JF’s mental capacity. A Consultant 
Forensic and Clinical Psychologist had given evidence that JF had a low IQ (in the range 68-
ϳϰͿ aŶd had ͞pooƌ͟ ƌeasoŶiŶg skills.  
 
HELD, DISMISSING THE APPEALS, that there had been no misdirection on the established 
law adverse to the appellants (at [22] and [27]). 
 
For unlawful act manslaughter, two elements had to be ͞carefully differentiated: the 
requisite state of mind and the requirement of dangerousness in relation to the unlawful 
act͟ (at [16]). The Court of Appeal dealt with these in reverse order. Starting with the 
second element, and following R v Larkin [1943] 1 KB 174, R v Church [1966] 1 QB 59 and 
DPP v Newbury & Jones [1977] AC 500; [1976] 2 WLR 918, the test for determining whether 
an unlawful act was dangerous was objective (at [17] – [21]), with the key question being 
ǁhetheƌ ͞all soďeƌ aŶd ƌeasoŶaďle people͟ ǁould ƌeĐogŶise the ƌisk of soŵe haƌŵ aƌisiŶg 
from the unlawful act. In the 1980s, a subjective gloss had been added to the test whereby 
the circumstances known to the defendant were attributed to the sober and reasonable 
bystander (R v Watson (1989) 89 Crim App R 211), but otherwise the objective nature of the 
test had ͞ďeeŶ estaďlished siŶĐe at least ϭ9ϰϯ͟ (at [21]). There was therefore ͞Ŷo douďt͟ 
that McKinnon J had correctly directed the jury on the ŵeaŶiŶg of daŶgeƌousŶess ͞oŶ the 
basis of the well-estaďlished laǁ͟ ;at [ϮϮ]Ϳ.  
 
With regard to the first element required for unlawful act manslaughter ;the ͞ƌeƋuisite state 
of ŵiŶd͟Ϳ, the trial judge had – correctly – directed the jury that, in order to establish the 
mens rea of the unlawful act (in the present case, reckless arson), the Crown had to make 
the jury sure that the appellants had either intended unlawful damage or that they were 
subjectively reckless with respect to such damage (as required by R v G & Another [2003] 
UKHL 50; [2004] 1 AC 1034). The judge had then – wrongly – directed the jury that the 
prosecution had to prove that the appellants had foreseen or contemplated the possibility 
that someone might be in the building. The latter direction ͞went further than was required, 
as it stated the law more favourably to the appellants͟ ;at [Ϯϲ]Ϳ. 
 
The submission that the objective test foƌ estaďlishiŶg ͞daŶgeƌousŶess͟ should be adapted 
took the court into an area ͞where the law is clearly established͟ ;at [ϯϬ]Ϳ. It was therefore 
foƌ PaƌliaŵeŶt to deteƌŵiŶe ǁhetheƌ the ͞Đleaƌ aŶd ǁell estaďlished laǁ͟ Ŷeeded to ďe 
changed in the light of various recommendations made by the Law Commission or whether 




As Lord Thomas CJ in the present case makes clear, an objective test for establishing 
͞daŶgeƌousŶess͟ in unlawful act manslaughter has been used since 1943 (at least) and was 
confirmed by the House of Lords in Newbury & Jones in 1976. It is unsurprising, therefore, 
that the Court of Appeal declined to make any ĐhaŶges to suĐh a ͞loŶg estaďlished͟ ƌule aŶd 
left the decision as to whether such a change should be made to Parliament pursuant to any 
recommendations made (or that may in future be made) by the Law Commission. If this 
area of law is to be re-examined, there are (at least) three options: 
 
1. Change the test to a subjective test 
2. Modify the objective test 
3. Maintain the status quo 
 
Option 1: Change the test to a subjective test 
One option would be to change the Larkin / Church test to require proof that the accused 
had foƌeseeŶ the ƌisk of soŵe haƌŵ, as opposed to that ƌisk haǀiŶg ďeeŶ foƌeseeŶ ďǇ ͞all 
soďeƌ aŶd ƌeasoŶaďle people͟. The case for making this change is that an objective test 
arguably sets the bar too low for homicide liability. As Lord Bingham observed in R v G & 
Another (albeit in the context of the meaning of the ǁoƌd ͞recklessness͟ in the Criminal 
Damage Act 1971): 
 
͞It is a salutary principle that conviction of serious crime should depend on proof 
not simply that the defendant caused an injurious result to another but that his 
state of ŵiŶd ǁheŶ so aĐtiŶg ǁas Đulpaďle… It is ĐleaƌlǇ ďlaŵeǁoƌthǇ to take aŶ 
obvious and significant risk of causing injury to another. But it is not clearly 
blameworthy to do something involving a risk if one genuinely does not perceive 
the risk. Such a person may fairly be accused of stupidity or lack of imagination, 
but neither of those failings should expose him to conviction of serious crime or 
the ƌisk of puŶishŵeŶt.͟ ;at [ϯϮ]Ϳ 
 
Such a change would be consistent with the general trend in English criminal law over the 
last 25 years or so, with decisions such as that of the House of Lords in R v Savage; DPP v 
Parmenter [1992] 1 AC 699, [1991] 3 WLR 914 and R v G & Another emphasising the 
subjective interpretation of recklessness in the context of the Offences Against the Person 
Act 1861 and Criminal Damage Act 1971, respectively. On the other hand, it must be 
acknowledged that Parliament, by enacting the Sexual Offences Act 2003, has ͞oďjeĐtified͟ 
the mens rea for sexual offences, by replacing (subjective) recklessness as to (lack of) 
consent with a lack of reasonable belief in consent.  
 
Nine years ago, the Law Commission (LC) proposed that the dangerousness test for unlawful 
act manslaughter should be changed to a subjective one (Murder, Manslaughter and 
Infanticide (2006), Law Com No 304, at [2.163]). The definition of ͞ĐƌiŵiŶal aĐt 
manslaughteƌ͟ would require proof that the accused had caused the death of another 
peƌsoŶ eitheƌ ͞;aͿ thƌough a ĐƌiŵiŶal aĐt iŶteŶded to Đause iŶjuƌǇ, oƌ ;ďͿ thƌough a ĐƌiŵiŶal 
aĐt iŶ the aǁaƌeŶess that it iŶǀolǀed a seƌious ƌisk of ĐausiŶg soŵe iŶjuƌǇ͟ ;at [ϯ.ϰϱ]Ϳ. This 
definition closely followed proposals put forward by the Home Office, Reforming the Law on 
Involuntary Manslaughter: The Government’s Proposals (2000) (at [2.11]). 
 
One drawback with changing the test for dangerousness to a subjective test is that unlawful 
act manslaughter would then become little more than a watered-down version of subjective 
ƌeĐkless ŵaŶslaughteƌ. This offeŶĐe is Đoŵŵitted if the aĐĐused Đauses death aŶd ͞ǁas 
aware of the necessary degree of risk of serious injury to the victim and nevertheless chose 
to disƌegaƌd it, oƌ ǁas iŶdiffeƌeŶt to it͟ ;EǀaŶs LJ iŶ R v Lidar (2000) 4 Arch. News 3).  
 
Option 2: Modify the objective test 
Another option would be to amend the Larkin / Church test to ƌeƋuiƌe pƌoof that ͞all soďeƌ 
aŶd ƌeasoŶaďle people͟ ǁould haǀe foƌeseeŶ the ƌisk of ͞serious͟ harm, as opposed to 
͞soŵe͟ haƌŵ. This ƌepƌeseŶts the laǁ iŶ the common law states of Australia (New South 
Wales, South Australia and Victoria). In Wilson v R [1992] HCA 31; (1992) 174 CLR 313, a 
majority of the High Court of Australia declared that ͞aŶ appƌeĐiaďle ƌisk of seƌious iŶjuƌǇ is 
ƌeƋuiƌed iŶ the Đase of ŵaŶslaughteƌ ďǇ aŶ uŶlaǁful aŶd daŶgeƌous aĐt͟ (Mason CJ, Toohey, 
Gaudron and McHugh JJ at [49]). The majority approved an earlier decision of the Supreme 
Court of Victoria in R v Holzer [1968] VR 481. In that case, the court explicitly departed from 
Church, whereas other Australian state courts had followed the English Court of Criminal 
Appeal. Recognising the need to resolve the conflict in the authorities, the High Court in 
Wilson preferred Holzer. The majority in Wilson said that ͞theƌe aƌe good ƌeasoŶs ǁhǇ the 
test in Holzer should be preferred... One is the development of the law towards a closer 
correlation between moral culpability and legal responsibility. Another is that the scope of 
ĐoŶstƌuĐtiǀe Đƌiŵe should ďe ĐoŶfiŶed to ǁhat is tƌulǇ uŶaǀoidaďle͟ ;at [ϯϮ]Ϳ. More recently, 
the majority judgment in Wilson was approved by a majority of the same court in R v 
Lavender [2005] HCA 37; (2005) 222 CLR 67 (Gleeson CJ, McHugh, Gummow and Hayne JJ at 
[128]). 
  
Ten years before the 2006 Report, the LC recommended that unlawful act manslaughter be 
abolished (Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (1996) Law Com No 237, 
at [5.16]). The justification for doing so was essentially based on the Larkin / Church test for 
͞dangerousness͟ setting too low a threshold for homicide liability. The LC stated (emphasis 
in original): 
 
͞We ĐoŶsideƌ that it is ǁƌoŶg iŶ pƌiŶĐiple foƌ the laǁ to hold a peƌsoŶ 
responsible for causing a result that he did not intend or foresee, and which 
would not even have been foreseeable by a reasonable person observing his 
conduct. Unlawful act manslaughter is therefore, we believe, unprincipled 
because it requires only that a foreseeable risk of causing some harm should 
haǀe ďeeŶ iŶheƌeŶt iŶ the aĐĐused’s ĐoŶduĐt, ǁheƌeas he is convicted of actually 
causing death, and also to some extent punished for doing so.͟ ;at [ϯ.ϲ]Ϳ 
 
However, the LC did not recommend abandoning an objective standard altogether. Under 
the LC’s pƌoposals theƌe ǁould haǀe ďeeŶ Ŷo diƌeĐt replacement for unlawful act 
manslaughter; instead, the LC recommended the creation of a Ŷeǁ offeŶĐe of ͞killing by 
gross carelessness͟. This offence would have required proof that the accused had caused 
death when a ͞ƌisk of death oƌ seƌious iŶjuƌǇ would have been obvious to a reasonable 
peƌsoŶ iŶ the aĐĐused’s positioŶ͟ ;at [ϱ.Ϯϳ]Ϳ, i.e. an objective test, albeit subject to the 
pƌoǀiso that ͞the aĐĐused ŵust haǀe ďeeŶ Đapaďle of appƌeĐiatiŶg the ƌisk at the ŵateƌial 
tiŵe͟ ;at [ϱ.Ϯ9]Ϳ. The final element of the proposed offence would have added a subjective 
gloss, albeit not in every case; the Crown would have been required to prove either that (i) 
the aĐĐused’s ĐoŶduĐt ͞fell faƌ ďeloǁ ǁhat Đould ƌeasoŶaďlǇ ďe eǆpeĐted of hiŵ iŶ the 
ĐiƌĐuŵstaŶĐes͟, or ;iiͿ the aĐĐused ͞iŶteŶded ďǇ his ĐoŶduĐt to Đause soŵe iŶjuƌǇ oƌ ǁas 
aware of, and unreasonably took, the ƌisk that it ŵight do so͟ ;at [ϱ.ϯϭ]Ϳ. 
 
Option 3: Maintain the status quo 
Of course, there is always the option of maintaining the status quo. On this point, it should 
be noted that English law is consistent with Canadian law. In R v Creighton [1993] 3 SCR 3; 
(1993) 105 DLR (4th) 632, a majority of the Supreme Court of Canada rejected an argument 
that the objective test for dangerousness in the context of unlawful act manslaughter was 
unconstitutional. In that case, McLachlin J (as she then was, and with whom L’Heureux-Dubé, 
GoŶthieƌ aŶd CoƌǇ J agƌeedͿ said that ͞the test foƌ the mens rea of unlawful act 
manslaughter in Canada, as in the United Kingdom [sic], is objective foreseeability of the risk 
of bodily harm which is neither trivial Ŷoƌ tƌaŶsitoƌǇ, iŶ the ĐoŶteǆt of a daŶgeƌous aĐt͟. IŶ 
justifying this stance, McLachlin J drew an analogy with the thin-skull rule: 
 
͞The thin-skull rule is a good and useful principle. It requires aggressors, once 
embarked on their dangerous course of conduct which may foreseeably injure others, 
to take responsibility for all the consequences that ensue, even to death. That is not, 
in my view, contrary to fundamental justice... In fact, when manslaughter is viewed in 
the context of the thin-skull principle, the disparity diminishes between the mens rea 
of the offence and its consequence. The law does not posit the average victim. It says 
the aggressor must take the victim as he finds him. Wherever there is a risk of harm, 
there is also a practical risk that some victims may die as a result of the harm. At this 
point, the test of harm and death merge.͟ 
 
The Creighton decision has been confirmed several times subsequently by the Supreme 
Court of Canada (R v Sarrazin 2011 SCC 54; [2011] 3 SCR 505 at [18]; R v Maybin 2012 SCC 
24; [2012] 2 SCR 30 at [36]; R v H 2013 SCC 28, [2013] 2 SCR 269 at [91]). Meanwhile, the 
minority of the High Court of Australia in Wilson approved the Larkin / Church test on the 
ďasis that ͞ǁe aƌe uŶaďle to see ǁhǇ, iŶ assessiŶg aŶ aĐt as daŶgeƌous, it is ŶeĐessaƌǇ to 
disregard the risk of any injury which does not fall within the category of grievous bodily 
haƌŵ͟ ;BƌeŶŶaŶ, DeaŶe aŶd DaǁsoŶ JJ at [9]Ϳ. 
 
Conclusion 
The Court of Appeal is undoubtedly right to refuse to even contemplate changing a rule of 
criminal law that has survived, more-or-less unchanged, for over 70 years and which has 
been explicitly endorsed by the House of Lords. That places the onus firmly on the 
government to put proposals for change before Parliament but, given that the (Labour) 
government decided not to do so when reforming voluntary manslaughter in 2009, it seems 
unlikely that the Conservative administration will make it a priority. Indeed, as Michael Allen 
saǇs, ͞It is uŶlikelǇ that aŶǇ fuƌtheƌ ƌefoƌŵ of hoŵiĐide ǁill take plaĐe iŶ the foƌeseeaďle 
futuƌe͟ ;Textbook on Criminal Law, 13th edition (2015), OUP, at p.374). 
